Category: James K.A. Smith

N.T. Wright (in response to James K.A. Smith) on tradition, creedalism, and canonical readings.

"I'm not persuaded that the fruits of historical science have suddenly put us in a position superior to pre-modern interpreters."

A few weeks ago James K.A. Smith wrote a bit about N.T. Wright’s new book How God Became King: The Forgotten Story of the Gospels (see “Kings, Creeds, and the Canon: Musings on N.T. Wright”). Initially he praised the work, then he moved into his critique. To summarize Smith didn’t like (1) that Wright seems to present his views on the Kingdom of God in the Gospels as something of which everyone is woefully ignorant until he came to explain it; (2) that Wright talks about the creeds as if they are “…the villain that tempted us to miss this ‘forgotten story.’ “; and (3) Wright dismisses “canonical readings” of Scripture (if this true then what are we to make of this video titled ‘The Whole Sweep of Scripture’ produced by The Work of the People featuring Wright?) and “the rule of faith” because he sees “tradition” as a “blinder.” Smith announces, “I’m not persuaded that the fruits of historical science have suddenly put us in a position superior to pre-modern interpreters.” (This is his challenge to Wright’s “originality” as someone who is as much a historian as a theologian.)

To summarize, Smith doesn’t think Wright has introduced something new that the Reformed tradition overlooked. He doesn’t see historical research as having added something essential to our understanding of Christian doctrine that the canon and creeds failed to provide. This book says what people like Abraham Kuyper, Richard Mouw, or others in the Reformed tradition have said already.

Some people commented questioning Smith’s suggestion that Wright sees himself as delivering something new that is actually quite old. One person pointed out that even if there have been people saying the things Wright is saying this doesn’t mean it is not a message that many still need to hear. Then N.T. Wright responded:

"And, excuse me, what’s this about me being dismissive of ‘canonical’ readings?"

He began by clarifying that his experience has led him to come across many people who do not have a solid answer for why we need the “content” of the Gospels themselves. Many see the reason for Jesus as being his death, burial, and resurrection. What are we to do with Jesus’ life and teachings? I must say as someone who has been around Pentecostal and E/evangelical groups if it weren’t for the writings of Wright I wouldn’t have an answer to that question either. It is great that Smith’s tradition has addressed this subject. For the rest of us who are outside Reformed circles with little to no interest in entering we are thankful for the work Wright has done on this subject.

Second, Wright defends his appreciation of the creeds. I must quote a large section:

“I take care precisely NOT to ‘fault’ the great creedal tradition. I use the two classic creeds in my regular prayers and worship – in the Anglican manner: the Apostles’ Creed every day, and the Nicene Creed at the Sunday Eucharist. (Just as they do at Calvin, of course.) The creeds are not the ‘villains’. They were not written to provide a teaching syllabus. They are the symbol, the badge, the list of things that were controversial early on which the church had to hammer out. The problem comes – and at what point in church history this occurred I couldn’t say, that not being my period – when the creeds are used as teaching outlines; because of course they skip precisely over the ‘middle bits’ of the gospels, and thereby, quite accidentally and non-villainously, collude with a quite different movement, with which many of my readers tell me they are all too familiar: a form of Christianity in which it would be quite sufficient if Jesus of Nazareth had been born of a virgin, died on a cross and never done anything in between. The rise of such a truncated form of Christianity is not at all (I suggest) the fault of the wonderful and beloved Creeds, but of quite different movements which have then (ab)used them as a teaching outline which has reinforced (quite accidentally in terms of the Creeds’ original purpose) the omission of the kingdom of God as a present reality. In other words, I not only don’t reject Nicene Christianity, I embrace it, affirm it, love it, live it, and pray it. But the best sort of Nicene Christianity has always insisted that you read the gospels themselves, and indeed pray the Lord’s Prayer, and that these are just as important for shaping who we are in Christ as the formulaic creeds themselves.”

'How God Became King' by N.T. Wright.

Third, Wright rejects that he dismisses canonical readings. He states that his book is “a plea to let the canon be the canon!” According to Wright appeals to “the canon” often mean appeals to a tradition and not the biblical canon at all.

Finally, Wright refutes Smith’s seeming dismissal of extra canonical literature. He states,

“So what’s this about ‘extra-canonical resources’? This is often said but it’s (frankly) nonsense. Without extra-canonical resources – e.g. lexicography – I would not be able to read the New Testament at all. Without knowing a bit about who the Pharisees were – and what the Sabbath meant to a second-Temple Jew – I wouldn’t understand Mark 2. And so on.”

Then Wright goes on to say a few more good things about the necessity of understanding at least some things about the context of Second Temple Judaism and the first century world. I am thankful to Smith for highlighting what he thought should be approved (I haven’t read the book yet), but as someone who has read a lot of Wright’s work over the years I am more appreciative of his response which I think frames his project as I have understood it. One comment said that the next generation will look at Wright’s work “as just another dead end project.” This is false already. For many of us in that already emerging next generation he has helped us rethink the Apostle Paul, the message of the Gospel, the Kingdom of God, the use of Hebrew Scripture in the New Testament, Second Temple Judaism, eschatology (one pastor friend of mine said he had given up on eschatology until he read Surprised by Hope), and so forth and so on. In some sense most scholars are forgotten in a generation or two. That is how the guild functions. To say Wright’s work is a dead end is to ignore the impact it has had already! (Of course, that person said in his comment that Barth’s project was “a dead end” and although I am not a Barthian I think this overlooks the reality that Barth remains one of the most influential theologians even now.)

Update (04/13): Smith replied to Wright and Wright has added a couple additional comments. Make sure to read those as well! 

Interpreting Derrida: Deconstruction

Let me state from the beginning what this post is communicating and what it is not communicating. On one hand, it is going to present my understanding of “deconstruction” as it is associated with Jacques Derrida. This does invite people to challenge my interpretation of Derrida and limited dialog regarding the implications of Derrida’s approach. On the other hand, it is not a forum for chasing the “demonic Parisian” back into his philosophical hole. In other words, I don’t care if you like Derrida or hate him (I myself am influenced more by Gadamer than Derrida), that isn’t the subject being addressed. The subject being addressed is simple: What is deconstruction?

I hope that is clear.

OK, now let me see if I have this deconstruction thing understood and I’d would greatly appreciate any insight into where I am wrong. Deconstruction, in the words of Derrida, is partially “to not naturalize what isn’t natural–to not assume that what is conditioned by history, institutions, or society is natural.” This does not mean Derrida doesn’t believe in meaning or truth. It does mean that we must not assume perspective equates to universal. We cannot assume that any human understanding is somehow transcendental. We are contextualized beings and we understand/express things contextually.

This can be understood in positive or negative terminology.

James K.A. Smith presents it positively saying  that deconstruction is “a deeply affirmative mode of critique attentive to the way in which texts, structures and institutions marginalize and exclude ‘the other’, with a view to reconstructing and reconstituting institutions and practices to be more just”. (Jacques Derrida, Live Theory, 12).

As I have read Derrida this view of him that Smith presents has become more evident. It is not an appeal to some sort of moral relativism or the assertion that everything is essentially what the readers wants it to be since meaning falls apart in the end. Rather, it is an allowing of the unnatural side of things deemed natural to expose themselves by reading a text with both eyes open to possible prejudices inherit within.

As regards a negative analysis one Jack Reynolds says the following:

Deconstruction is parasitic in that rather than espousing yet another grand narrative, or theory about the nature of the world in which we partake, it restricts itself to distorting already existing narratives, and to revealing the dualistic hierarchies they conceal. While Derrida’s claims to being someone who speaks solely in the margins of philosophy can be contested, it is important to take these claims into account. Deconstruction is, somewhat infamously, the philosophy that says nothing. (See full article here)

He understands it to exist only within other attempts at metanarrative (therefore, it cannot be a metanarrative itself, since deconstruction cannot exist as some sort of free floating approach to the world). It is for Derrida the natural exposure of the internal contradictions and false assumptions buried within communicative acts (or “writing” as he calls them). Again, we must balance the act of seeing deconstruction as, yes, a slap in our epistemological face but also not pure relativism. Derrida expected to be understood. Derrida had an opinion. Derrida saw some form of right and wrong. But he knew that his views and those of others are not bullet proof and that language and communication have limits that is pressed expose inconsistencies. We must realize though that communication is still possible even as it deconstructs itself. It is just not perfect.

Short Book Review: Who’s Afraid of Postmodernism by James K.A. Smith

James K.A. Smith, Who's Afraid of Postmodernism

James K.A. Smith (2006). Who’s Afraid of Postmodernism: Taking Derrida, Lyotard, and Foucault to Church. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic.

Postmodernism–this word is essentially a profanity in many evangelical circles. It has also been (ab)used as a war cry for those Christians who have “emerged” from their modernist coreligionist. Most people have no idea what it means…maybe this is the most accurate appraisal.

For those confused by postmodernity evangelical philosopher James K.A. Smith provides a road map. Along the journey the reader is invited to worship God in the presence of the “unholy, Parisian Trinity” of Jacques Derrida, Jean-Francois Lyotard, and Michel Foucault. For those wondering what Jerusalem has to do with Paris this book is a starting point.

Smith begins by introducing the postmodern situation. The reader may find herself scandalized or he may shrug his shoulders as if Smith is describing the town in which you were raised. For both the modern peering in at postmodernity and the postmodern who is like a fish in water this book will provide a description of the world that is coming/has come.

It is from there that we are introduced to Derrida and his project of deconstruction. We are challenged by Derrida’s direct assault on our myth of objectivity when reading a text. At the same time we are challenged to ask where Derrida goes too far in his literary criticisms and what this means for a church that reads Scrip-ture.

Lyotard is next with his criticism of meta-narratives. How does Christianity–a story that explains everything from Creation to Eschaton–survive in a world post-meta-narrative (if we are in such a world)? Is the result some sort of cultural relativism?

The third and final stop is lunch with Foucault and his critique of power. Is all knowledge power? Is power bad in and of itself?

Smith is often very accommodating of these philosophers, but I found this helpful. We often hear from Christian writers how demonic these Frenchmen are. It is nice to see there is a good side (especially as one with French roots).

It is from here that a reader can launch into her own exploration of the merits and demerits of postmodern thought. Before the book ends Smith takes a look at the ecclesiological implications. I found myself struggling more with this chapter than the other ones. As a Reformed philosopher Smith’s arguments for dogmatics seems more befitting of a Papist. I wondered how a “Protestant” could appeal so strongly to tradition and catholicity in the sense that he does. It gave me a lot to ponder and I am sure it will do the same for you.