The Justice Conference
Tomorrow and Saturday I will be at The Justice Conference. I go to a handful of conferences every year, mostly as a representative of Western Seminary. It is rare that I am excited about attending since most of my trips benefit the institution more than they benefit me. This isn’t so with this conference. I would have considered going even if the seminary didn’t send me.
The Justice Conference launched last year is the city of Bend, OR. This year it moved to Portland to accommodate everyone. It had an attendance of about one thousand last year. I was told today that over four thousand will be preset this year.
The conference has many interesting sessions. I intend on going to some focusing on things like immigration reform, racial equality, gender equality and the like. This conference fills a real void in evangelicalism. The generation from which I come and those younger than me have wrestled with how to proclaim the Kingdom without going to bed with political parties who offer us solutions in exchange for our utmost loyalty. I hope we find our way!
I should add that this year’s speakers are amazing: Walter Brueggemann, Miraslov Volf, John Perkins, Francis Chan, Rick McKinely, Richard Twist, Lynne Hybels, Shaine Claiborne, Gerry Breshears, and many others I don’t know but anticipate discovering (side note: there is a better male to female ratio that my list portrays, I’m just not as familiar with many of the women speakers).
I think the conference is sold out now or very close, but consider attending next year. I imagine it will be even better. You can find more info at thejusticeconference.com!
Whose justice do we advocate for, God’s or man’s? How can we distinguish between the two?
This all depends upon what definition of justice we’re working for. If God’s justice and man’s justice are similar, (lets say: by right relationship with fellow men, no matter the racial/gender/social class), then advocating for one would may lead to advocating for the other. The difference would come from the ‘meta’ aspect of it (how we justify our views of justice). An atheist would perhaps ground their’s in some sort of evolutionary social theory, where as the Christian would ground theirs in God.
It’s been cool so far eh? Follow up blog? I’m gonna have a couple
@barobin: God’s ways are not man’s ways. Advocating for man’s morality not the same as advocating for God’s.
WRT atheistic morality, no atheist yet, has been able to show an objective basis for morality, and certainly not in evolutionary theory (where rape has a greater evolutionary advantage than morality). Atheistic morality so far has proved elusive.
Andrew
I agree that the “justice” of humanity is not that of God on all occasions. That said, the prophetic tradition into which John the Baptist and Jesus entered is one not afraid to critique the powers in the name of God. They depicted things like healing, exorcism, and so forth as the arrival of the Kingdom. The early followers of Jesus followed this example as we see in the Book of Acts, or the Apostle Paul’s declaration that the Kingdom is peace, joy, and righteousness/justice in the Spirit, or the Book of James wherein we find the social systems of the world criticized and dismantled in Messiah’s community. On this foundation we can work for the justice given by God to the world through his people.
Barobin
Agreed, it is not always and either/or. If humanity is aligning with the heart of God then justice can be shared.
Travis
Very cool and there will be a few blog posts on the conference.
@AndrewT: God’s ways cannot be completely different than ours…or it would not make sense to even talk about ‘God’s justice’ or to talk about the values of moral arguments nor natural theology, as you have before. If we believe God endowed us with some sort of natural abilities through means of being created in his image, we should expect some similarities between our morality and what God desires—-the moral argument is built upon this contingency— in other words, the moral argument is contingent upon humans having similar moral alignments with God.
In regards to atheistic morality, it does not matter if they have good or bad reasons for accepting an objectified morality (supposing all atheists care about objective morality) for my point to stand.
@AndrewT: If we want to talk about objective moral values and atheism, I think they can come up with some good objective reasons to be moral. The focus could be in C—>E (Cause and Effect) relations: That something is objectively wrong when it has ‘bad’ effects. So rape would be morally wrong because it has objective negative effects (psychological/physical); murder would be morally wrong because it has negative objective effects (stopping life—perhaps coupling that with this being our only ‘life’ under non-religious atheist beliefs; and psychological effects on those affected). Name calling would have objective negative effects (psychological stress), and thus would be objectively wrong. Certainly, this may create a morality that looks different than Christianity, but it would still be an objective system.
@Brian: I agree. (I’m not saying we shouldn’t advocate for justice, rather that when we do so must do so conforming to biblical principles, our ’causes’ are bound not by our own personal interests, but by biblical precepts). Some of the plenary talks at this conference linked to here, appear dubious as to whether or not they are indeed biblical; which is NOT to say they all are, or that the conference is without merit. If we reluctantly recognize that our individual sense of ‘justice’ is not perfect, at least we can hold ourselves accountable when we use our sense of injustice to motivate us.
@barobin: Don’t you see? What philosophical slight of hand did you just commit? How can you say that something is objectively wrong when it has a ‘bad’ effect? To define an effect as good or bad, you are must presuppose an objective standard for ‘bad’ and ‘good’, but no atheist can do that! In atheism there is no objective ‘good’ or ‘bad’ since without the nature of God to appeal to, any standard you choose, is arbitrary, and as sufficient as any other, so therefore relative. Even inept atheist philosophers could recognize this (which is why they became known as nihilists).
Try again then. Either show me how atheistic morality can be based upon cause/effect by also showing me the atheistic basis for gauging good effects from bad ones, or pose some other basis for morality. This time don’t draw on precepts inherited from a theistic world view.
@AndrewT: It seems obvious to me what the negative effect would be without invoking God—-physical and psychological stress/harm. Those are objective effects whether I feel the action to be morally wrong or right. It is not arbitrary in any way: Does murdering someone produce an effect regardless if God exists or not? In the atheistic picture, he will obviously have to account for that effect in the flourishing of the human species or his society. Does this have a negative effect to human flourishing or to society?
To illustrate this briefly, if I were to cut your hand off right now, would that lead to an objective negative or positive effect to you, regardless if God exists?
@barobin: From an evolutionary perspective it would give you advantage over me in terms of servival of the fittest. So, from an evolutionary perspective, cutting off my hand would be good, and moral WRT you.
@AndrewT: I am not an atheist, I just don’t feel the need to boil belief in God to a logical syllogistic account of morality. I think Christianity is true regardless if all other beliefs had objective accounts for morality— and I think atheists can come up with an account for morality that is objective. In other words, I don’t think Christians or monotheists have the monopoly on ‘objective morality.’
@baronbin: I make no assumptions about whether you are or are nt an atheist. Like you, I also think Christianity is true. Even so, if you feel an atheist is able to postulation some foundation for morality apart from the character of God – I invite you to show it. You will have achieved an accomplishment no (atheist) professional philosopher has been able to, if you do.
It may not be the case that Christian’s or monotheists have a monopoly on ‘objective morality’, but as it stands, no one to date has formulated a convincing alternative to God’s character as the universal objective standard for ‘goodness’ or ‘morality’. For monotheists to NOT have a monopoly, only one example of a universal morality apart from God needs to be cited, and though I cannot guarantee there no such thing exists, one has eluded the best minds, so far.
AndrewT: I just wanted to be clear so you would not think I was positing my own beliefs here
. I have showed you a possible route to go with this based upon the objectiveness of an effect caused by an action; rooted in perhaps a theory of societal or human flourishing. That is, actions are based upon C—>E interactions (effect now (E)); and this could be judged upon their (E) to an individual or individuals. If the (E) is negative, then this *could* be deemed an objectively ‘bad’ action. Cutting your hand off has an objective (E), the question is this (E) ‘negative’ or ‘positive’? Since this would bring psychological and physical harm to you and others, this action would be a ‘negative’ (E); and thus it would be ‘bad’ for me to cut off your hand. Is this result universally ‘bad’? All I have to ask is whether or not cutting someones hand off universally has an (E). This of course being one possibility that would need more exploration.
All we do as theists is push the question back ( i.e. Euthyphro dilemma).
Have you read all moral/ethical theories from atheist philosophers who’ve posited attempts at objective morality? What about Buddhism, which is atheistic, yet has objective morality based upon the Laws of Karma?
I would like to add that I think this question is a lot more complex than simply saying ‘no atheist philosopher has ever done so,’ or what I briefly posited as a possible option. We would need more time, space, and research before we could honestly say that this door is close: theists win the day on objective moral values.
@barobin: respectfully, I must accuse you of not having thought this through. You say “If the (E) is negative, then this *could* be deemed an objectively ‘bad’ action.” Ok, now you’ve defined ‘bad’ WRT ‘negative’, so I’ll agree, that’s one possible definition of ‘bad’, but again we’ll go one more step further down this same rabbit hole. So how do we now define ‘negative’?
Bear with me a second here; if I say something like “That hat is better than those marbles!” In what sense is the hat better? ‘Better’ begs a reference point – it means more ‘good’ and in this comparison, it must be ‘more good’ with respect to something NOT YET DEFINED. If I were saying it was better at being ‘red’, you’d have a reference point you could use to gauge if my comparison were correct. Likewise if my reference point were with respect to being ’round’, or being ‘alive’ you’d have entirely different reference points which would lead to entirely different assessments (perhaps even contradictory assessments).
‘Negative’ ( and positive ) are no different than ‘better’ or ‘worse’. When we talk numbers on a number line, the point of reference is the number line itself, with 0 as the absolute middle, and ‘negatve’ further to the left (than some position) and ‘positive’ being further to the right than some position. I cannot simply say 3 is more ‘negative’. The number 3 is more ‘negative’ than 7 but it is not more negative than 0. The reference point means everything!
So let’s get back to your new definition of ‘bad’, If the (E) is negative, what is it ‘negative’ with respect to (and on what basis should we choose this reference point as the correct one to use, to gauge this, since there are many possible reference points we could choose from, each producing differing results)?
You are appealing to our common sense of ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ as a common reference point, but that common reference point, in fact, belongs to a mono-theistic world view which says we share this common sense because we are both created in the image of one God. So this reference point is again founded in God’s nature. I’m challenging you to show me some reference apart from God.
AndrewT: I do not think you need the reference point scale for my argument: again, can what you describe happening to you, when your hand is cut off, as negative or positive? Even animals can recognize the basics of a negative/positive (E); ex: my cat knew that if I caught him on the table something ‘negative’ was going to happen, and so he would jump off the minute I walked towards him. The scales can come later if we so desire; just go to your local doctors office and look at the happy/sad face scale of deciding how bad your pain hurts. The ancient Egyptians did not need one of those products of modernity to know that losing a hand was negative. Again, if we bring God into the picture, all we do is push this problem back.
Look, we can go at this all day, the question is, are the atheistic arguments convincing in logically, or just not to you? Again, you make a lot of hasty generalizations, and you clearly over state your conclusion: ‘No atheist philosopher has ever done this.’ You may not be convinced that their argument does not work, but that does not mean their argument doesn’t work given an atheistic universe… just as Buddhist re-birth does work given no-self within the Buddhist framework (this does not mean this is how the universe is though).
@barobin: In your argument you say “The ancient Egyptians did not need one of those products of modernity to know that losing a hand was negative.” You are mistaking ontology from epistemology. I did not say an atheist could not recognize ‘moral’ behaviour. I said she had no basis for labelling as such. I would take this further though and say that atheist can even ‘act’ moral, while still disbelieving in God. However, as your own answers here prove, without an absolute standard (such as God) the atheist has a very difficult time stating exactly what a behaviour is in fact ‘moral’.
You also say I’ve made hasty generalizations, except that I’ve not made even one generalization. In my arguments I spoke universally and in doing so did not draw out principles from specific examples. When I say without a universal reference point things are relative, I’m saying that is true in every possible case. To prove me wrong you need simply show me but one counter-example, which you’ve not done.
I’ve already showed you that your example is subjective, and relative. You attempts to say on what grounds something is bad or good, moral or immortal, negative, or positive fail because you lack a reference point. When I point this out, you simply appeal to some relative reference. Something is immoral because it is bad, something is bad because it is negative …. WHAT MAKES IT SO?
Having my hand cut off may be ‘bad’ from my perspective, but it certainly isn’t ‘bad’ from yours (whether or not you are sympathetic). Me losing my hand has no bearing on you at all, save perhaps your opinion about the matter which is really just mere opinion, nothing absolute. If me losing my hand gives you an advantage, even if you feel sorry for me, it is good for you!
But just as your opinion counts for little in the big scheme of things, so does mine. Simply because I find it ‘bad’ you cut my hand off, does not make it so. If you find it good, and I find it bad, and 6 Billion other people simply find it neutral, your opinion counters mine, and ultimately, me losing my hand is of no consequence. When we have no reference point, all reference points are equally valid. If cutting off my hand is only bad respect to me, and no one else, clearly it isn’t ‘bad’ in any true objective sense.
When the Soviet Union existed one torturer was asked by his victim (who was in a great deal of pain, and near death, due to being tortured) “How can you do this to another human?”. The torturer answered “I do not feel your pain, it is yours alone; and since God does not exist, my actions are simply actions, and of no particular consequence to the universe! Besides, the Greeks held that virtue was being good at something. I am a very good torturer.”
Now you and I do recognize this as bad (in an objective sense), but I take that to be evidence God exists because I take it to be evidence of a universal reference point for morality. If God exists, and I was created in the image of God, then cutting off my hand is you defacing the image of God. Although your action may bring you temporary advantage, it is still intrinsically wrong in that you are marring God’s image in creation which is wrong whether or not you gain advantage. The reference point is God.
WRT to your cat example, again that is subjective. Simply because you do not want your cat on the table does not mean the cat being on the table is intrinsically ‘bad’. Your neighbour indeed allows his cat on the table, and if your cat were in his house, would likely be permitted also. Your cat NOT being on the table is merely your preference. Likewise, the problem with Buddhism is that it is relativistic. It also has no foundation.
AndrewT: 1) When you are making statements like ‘no atheist philosopher has,’ unless you’ve read a sizable portion of ethics/meta-ethics, you are making a hasty generalization.
The next thing to ask yourself is if the atheist philosophers who do write on ethics/meta-ethics have created a theory of objective morality, and its just not convincing to just you/ other Christian philosophers, or if it truly isn’t a worthy account of objective morality. That is one reason I brought up Buddhist re-birth and no-self— it would seem contrary to believe in reincarnation if there is no substance-self, as there are in other Indian philosophies. Yet I think re-birth and no-self work in a Buddhist universe…but I do not think the entire Buddhist project works in general. So what I am saying is, are you sure that atheists do not account for objective moral values even within a physicalist universe, or is it a matter of they do, but you do not find a physicalist universe convincing? Of course I am not urging you to answer this here, this is something for you to think about—-these sorts of questions could not be answered through a ‘back and forth’ on a blog…
2) Flowing directly into the point about Buddhism— it isn’t relativistic, it is just more tolerant of other believes because of reincarnation and how enlightenment works. Buddhism believes itself to be a truth with a capital T and that not all paths bring you to enlightenment…only the Buddha’s way— just read the Buddha’s teaching— Also, if you read Indian philosophy in general, you’ll soon realize that it is only ignorant Westernized approaches to spirituality that have turned many Eastern ideas into a John Hick styled universalism (this is not to say there are no universalists in Eastern philosophy). With this being said, the Buddhists would say what is ethical is built into the universe through the laws of karma–and this would mirror some strands atheists have gone. That what is morally right/wrong is built into the laws of nature/universe, much like not eating usually brings about the (E) of starving to death.
3) I do not think I confused moral epistemology with ontology— the point of the Egyptian and Cat analogies is to highlight something, and perhaps I was too gleefully wrapped up in my thoughts to realize I did not make this clear— but we are experiential creatures, we do not need some sort of ‘reference pointness’ in the likeness of a form, to tell us when we experience some sort of pain, pleasure, or ambivalence. Unless you believe that there is a ‘reference point’ for whether you like the taste of kimchee over the taste of a fudge bar? Of course you could argue that we may come to those conclusions without realizing the ‘reference point,’ as atheists perform morally good acts without realizing God, and of course I could agree with that (I do not confuse the statements of whether objective morals exist without God to whether atheists can be good without God; I know a thing or two about philosophy to not make that mistake
). However, I can imagine a universe, where there are no ghost ‘reference points’ for the goodness of a fudge bar over the taste of kimchee, but rather, because I am an experiential creature, this experience comes to me through the C—>(E) relations of what I eat and my physiology. The point I am making is this, we recognize certain things, and these certain things are objective because they are (E) brought about by a cause, regardless of how we interpret these (E). Also, it could be that the reference point is brought about by our experience of the (E)— since the dawn of time we experience pain at various levels and ergo, once we’ve developed a certain standard of medicine (like modern medicine) we finally formalize the varying levels of pain into a nice little doctors chart complete with a dozen of faces demonstrating a dozen different types of pain; obviously an atheist working with this point would need to be careful as to not fall into a subjectivism.
Continuing, again, I was not trying to create an analogous circumstance with the cat, where it is bad to sit on the table because of the negative (E) that I bring to the cat. Rather, even cats can experience the objectiveness of an (E). As I hinted at, the atheist would probably have to root their moral standard in the evolution of our minds and how we interact with our species, or society. That somehow we’ve evolved in such a way to recognize these to be ‘bad,’ because of the (E) they entail. Certainly this may create a morality much different than Christianity, but I think it is adequate enough to account for morality. Does it give some universal ‘good’ or ‘bad,’ maybe, maybe not depending on how minds evolve in the universe. But atheists, even those who believe in objective moral values, may not care to even answer that question— they maybe looking to answer that question for only humans. You press it further by saying, but can atheism really answer if it is ‘really really bad?’ This all depends on what you mean here by ‘really really bad.’ I do not think resting this question in God makes it any better as I argue for in point (4). I hope I clarified this up a bit.
4) Invoking God for an objective standard does no better in establishing what it means for an action to be bad/good…all it does is push the question back one. How do you know what God commands is actually morally good? You have two options— Whatever God commands is morally good (and thus God could command actions we perceive to be bad as actually being good) or that God follows a standard of goodness (and this would then mean that there exists something outside of God that God follows). Christian philosophers that I’ve seen answering this question (Paul Copan and Craig), usually want to jump over the problem and say, ‘well God’s nature is good and what he commands arises out of his nature and therefore his commands are good.’ The problem with this statement should be obvious: it is circular. How do we know God’s nature to be good? You have to use God (the standard of goodness) to know whether his nature is actually good (this is starting to get into why, while I appreciate natural theology, I am not a baptized believer). In other words, invoking God just explains the moral obligations we are to follow, but not why they really are good/bad. Certainly I believe God is good and what he commands arises out of this nature, but again, this is about giving some sort of convincing account of objective moral values to those who are non-believers.
@barobin: I appreciate the additional points you’ve made, but I’ve presented a number of counter arguments to your position, which you keep glossing over, or ignore.
Simply asserting something to be true does not make it true. For example, for something to be objectively true, it must be true apart from man, (by definition). Therefore you cannot simply assert that on the one hand, we do not require a reference point, and then on the other, continue calling the morality you are trying to describe as objective (since you deny that it is relative, and subjective).
No more suspense: please show us how an atheist’s morality is ‘objective’. For your position to be true, you only need to show the objective universal basis (apart from man) of the moral system you are trying to describe. So let’s address the issues you’ve already been confronted with, before we introduce new ones, ok?
Here are some of the questions that remain avoided (summarized for clarity):
1. What is your proposed basis for objective morals (beyond mere convention say)?
2. If experience is a basis for morality, why is it not immoral when a cat kills a mouse, since both the cat and the mouse ‘experience’?
3. What do you mean by ‘something is negative’ and what does this have to do with morality?